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If you negligently cause damage to my property, I can sue you for the cost of
repairing it or replacing it. However, if you can show that my negligent conduct
contributed to the causation of the damage, that will significantly affect my claim.
As Vera Bergelson notes (pp. 52-56), on a draconian version of the doctrine of
"contributory negligence," it destroys my case-I can claim nothing from you. On
a more plausible and less draconian version of the doctrine, as a doctrine of
"comparative negligence," it reduces the amount I can claim; I must now share the
cost of the damage in proportion to my negligent contribution to it. In tort law, the
victim's conduct, in particular the victim's faulty conduct, thus plays a crucial role
in determinations of liability. In criminal law, by contrast, matters seem very
different. Unless the victim's conduct was such as to defeat the claim that the
defendant caused the relevant harm, it does not qualify or undermine the
defendant's liability in the way that it can in tort law. I might have negligently or
recklessly placed myself or my property at risk, but if you caused damage to me or
my property, either on purpose or through your reckless conduct, you are guilty of
a criminal offense, and my recklessness or negligence does not seem to defeat, or
even qualify, your guilt.
One of Bergelson's aims is to point out how misleading that familiar contrast
between tort law and criminal law is by reminding us of some familiar ways in
which the victim's (or alleged victim's) conduct can make a significant difference
to the defendant's liability. If V consented to what D did to him, or at least
voluntarily assumed the risk that D would do that, then D might be entitled to a
complete acquittal (or to conviction only of a lesser crime or at least to some
mitigation of sentence). The same is true if D acted defensively to ward off V's
attack or if V provoked D. But her aims are more ambitious than such a reminder
of familiar features of our criminal law. Bergelson also wants to explain and
justify (and show the unity of) such provisions by a more general account of the
ways in which victims' conduct can affect defendants' liability, and to ground that
account in a conception of rights as essentially conditional on the right-holder's
own conduct. What makes a difference to D's criminal liability in the familiar
kinds of case noted above is that in each case, V "by his own acts, has waived or
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reduced his right not to be harmed." (P. 4.) Such waiving or reducing, which can
be voluntary or involuntary, provides D with either a complete or at least a partial
justification for his deed. This account, Bergelson argues, makes good and
coherent sense of aspects of our existing criminal law. It also, she thinks, enables
us to see how our criminal law can be improved to do justice to the difference that
victims' conduct should make to defendants' liability.
In the course of this overall argument, we get detailed discussions of the
proper contours of the defenses (consent, self-defense, and provocation) on which
her account focuses; but I will focus here on the overall argument and some of the
questions that it provokes.
I. TORT LAW AND CRIMINAL LAW
First, I think we should set aside the analogy that Bergelson draws between
tort law and criminal law, since it is at best unhelpful (and at worst misleading).
Although, as she notes (p. 52), the distinction between tort law and criminal law is
blurred by provisions for punitive damages in tort law, and compensation or
restitution orders in criminal law, the basic logic of the two kinds of law differs in
a way that renders them disanalogous for present purposes. In a paradigm tort law
case, what is at stake is who should bear the cost of the harm or damage that has
been caused-a cost that is supposed to be, at least in principle, finite and
determinable. The doctrine of comparative fault holds, rather plausibly, that the
cost should be allocated in proportion to the faulty contribution that each of the
parties involved made to the harm: if the plaintiffs negligence contributed to the
causation of the harm, she should bear some of the cost; likewise, if more than one
defendant contributed to the causation of the harm, the cost of repair or
compensation should be shared between them. In this context we can properly say,
with Bergelson, that it would be "unfair to assign all the responsibility for an injury
to one party, the [defendant], and completely ignore the victim's contribution," if
that contribution was itself faulty. (P. 53.) Furthermore, in this context,
responsibility shared is responsibility reduced for each of those who share it: "to
the extent the injurious result is attributable to an act of another, the offender
should not bear responsibility for it." (P. 54.) If you and I must share
responsibility for the damage to my property, we must share the cost of repairing
it; I cannot claim that you should pay the whole cost. Equally, if my car is
destroyed as the result of the negligent behavior of ten other people, I am entitled
to claim the full cost of replacing it from the ten of them. However, I cannot claim
that each should pay the full cost; rather, each should pay one-tenth.
We can also say in the context of the criminal law that it would be unfair to
assign all the responsibility for an injury to the defendant if the victim was also, at
least to some degree, responsible for the harm that he suffered; but the meaning
and implications of this claim are now quite different, because the responsibility at
stake is now quite different. The question now is not who is or should be held
liable to carry the cost of repairing the harm, but rather who is or should be held
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liable to conviction and punishment for culpably causing that harm. In this
context, responsibility that is shared is not thereby necessarily reduced, since it is
not now responsibility as to a finite burden. If my car is destroyed by an act of
criminal vandalism, it might turn out that there was just one perpetrator, who was
solely responsible for destroying it, or ten, who destroyed it between them. Yet in
the latter case, no one would suggest that the criminal responsibility of each
perpetrator is reduced, or that each should be convicted of a lesser crime or receive
a lighter sentence.
To argue or show in the context of tort law that the plaintiff was partly
responsible for the harm that she suffered is thus already to argue or show that the
defendant's responsibility is reduced, and that his liability-how much he should
have to pay-is also reduced. To argue or show in the context of criminal law that
the victim was partly responsible for the crime is not in the same way already to
argue or show that the defendant's responsibility is reduced, or that his liability-
the offense of which he is convicted and the punishment that he receives-should
also be reduced. We need some further argument for those further claims.
Furthermore, in tort law, what seems to be crucial, on Bergelson's account, is
the victim-plaintiff's fault. What reduces the defendant's responsibility is not just
that the victim-plaintiff played a causal role in the occurrence of the harm, but that
she was at fault in doing so.' But it is not the victim's fault that is crucial in the
criminal context. This is clearest in the case of consent: whether consent negates
an element of the offense, or provides a justification for its commission, its
normative efficacy does not typically depend on its being wrongful or faulty. But
the point also applies to self-defense, since both culpable and innocent aggressors,
on Bergelson's account, waive their rights and thus justify the defender's action.
(P. 72.)2 An attacker might thus be free of fault, but his attack still justifies his
target's use of defensive force. Only in the case of provocation, therefore, is the
victim's fault crucial to the reduction of the defendant's responsibility or liability;
the victim's fault does not provide a unifying rationale.
II. RIGHT-WAIVING, CRIME AND JUSTIFICATION
Second, what does provide the unifying rationale is the suggestion that, in all
three kinds of case, the (alleged) victim "has waived or reduced his right not to be
harmed." (P. 4.) That waiver might be voluntary, as when the victim consents to
or assumes the risk of what is done; or it might be involuntary, for instance when
I Although it must also be a good, and complete, defense to a claim in tort law that the
plaintiff consented to what the defendant did, there are clearly plenty of other ways, beyond those
involving some contributory fault, in which the plaintiff's conduct can affect the defendant's liability.
2 More precisely, "aggressors who chose to change their moral status vis-A-vis the
perpetrator" thereby waive or forfeit their rights, even if their attack was excused or justified; when
the aggressor or threat lacks such power of choice, his rights are overridden rather than waived or
forfeited. (P. 76.)
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the victim "somehow assault[ed] an important right of the perpetrator" (p. 107),
thus justifying or partly justifying the perpetrator's action. Now there are familiar
worries about the suggestion that we can understand such justifications as self-
defense in terms of a waiving of rights (some of which Bergelson addresses), but
there is a particular worry about how this suggestion fits with other aspects of her
account. She insists that an agent can plead justification only if she was both
aware of and motivated by the factors that ground the justification (p. 63)-she
must have acted "in order to achieve [the] better balance of harms and evils" that
makes her action justifiable. (P. 93, emphasis added.) Bergelson also argues that
conduct should be criminal only if it either violates the victim's rights or
disregards the victim's dignity. (P. 67.) These three propositions, however, seem
to be inconsistent. If V has waived his right not to be harmed in a certain way, then
one who harms him in that way has not violated his rights, whether or not she
knows that V has waived his rights, or knows the facts in virtue of which V counts
as having waived his rights, or is motivated by any morally proper intention. If the
harmer has not violated V's rights, she has committed a crime only if, in acting as
she did, she disregarded V's dignity; but nothing in Bergelson's discussion of
dignity and how it is violated suggests that this will always be so-that I violate
another's dignity whenever I act in a way that would violate a right if she had not
waived it. If by attacking you I waive my right not to be killed, then in killing me
you do not violate my right, whatever you know about the situation and whatever
your motives. Likewise, if by putting a television that I no longer need at the
roadside I thereby waive my rights as its owner and invite anyone to take it,
someone who takes it does not violate my rights, even if he thinks he is stealing it
without my consent. So it seems that Bergelson cannot maintain both her account
of justification and her claim that what gives D a defense in the cases she discusses
is that Vhas waived his rights.
I think that Bergelson is right about justifications. If a liability-negating
factor is properly classed as a matter of justification, rather than as negating an
element of the offense, then the defendant who seeks an acquittal on the basis of
that factor must adduce evidence not merely of its existence, but that she was
aware of and motivated by it. But her account of the nature of crime makes the
violation of rights (or dignity) an essential element of the offense itself-if V has
waived or reduced his rights, then the offense has not been committed (or has not
been committed in its most serious form), and D need make no claim about what
she knew or what motivated her. If Bergelson is to sustain her (plausible)
conception of justification, she must therefore either revise her conception of
crime, and argue that I can commit a criminal wrong against V without infringing
either his rights or his dignity (which does not look a plausible route for her to
3 It is not entirely clear how the idea of an "involuntary" waiver or reduction of rights fits
with the claim that a right is waived or forfeited only when the agent chooses "to change their moral
status vis-A-vis the perpetrator" (p. 76), since a chosen change of moral status is hardly involuntary.
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take), or abandon her claim that when V's conduct precludes or qualifies D's
liability, that is because V "has waived or reduced his right not to be harmed." (P.
4.)
III. WHAT RIGHTS ARE WAIVED (OR REDUCED)?
Third, there is a further, familiar puzzle about just which rights V should be
taken to have "waived or reduced," especially in the contexts of self-defense and
provocation (it is easier to work out what rights V has waived in the contexts of
consent and assumption of risk). Take first the case in which V's conduct gives D
a complete justification for her action-a case of self-defense, for instance. If the
only way in which D can protect herself against a murderous attack by V is to kill
V, she is justified in doing that; so on Bergelson's account, V has waived his right
not to be killed. Suppose, however, that D could easily defend herself by causing a
harm less serious than death to V, either by injuring V, perhaps, or by damaging
V's property (suppose V is, as D knows, so attached to his car that D could divert
him from his attack for long enough to make her own safe escape simply by
throwing a rock at his car, for example). Under such circumstances, D is fully
justified only in doing that lesser harm to V; if she kills V, thus using more force
and causing more harm than is reasonably necessary to defend herself, she can
claim only "partial justification." (P. 105.) So it seems that in this case, V has not
waived his right not to be killed (for if he had waived it, D would not commit a
criminal wrong in killing him); but he has waived his right not to suffer whatever
harm (whatever infringement of what would have been a right had he not waived
it) is reasonably necessary for D to cause in defending herself.
One implication of this picture is that what rights I waive by my action can
depend not just on the nature of that action, but also on the circumstances that
determine what must be done to frustrate my attack. If two people mount would-
be murderous attacks that are similar in their culpability and seriousness, one
might think that both should be taken to have waived the same rights, to the same
extent; but if fortuitously, one attack could be warded off without causing fatal, or
even serious, harm to the attacker, whilst the other can be warded off only by
killing him, it seems that, on Bergelson's account, they have waived different
rights-the latter, but not the former, has waived his right not to be killed.
Perhaps, as Bergelson suggests, a suitably context-sensitive, relational account of
rights would allow for this, but there is another, more serious problem about the
rights that are, and those that are not, waived, and the relation between them-
which is also a puzzle about what it means to "reduce" one's rights.
If D kills V when she could have warded off his attack by simply wounding
him, or by damaging his car, she has presumably violated his right not to be
killed-a right that he has not waived. He has waived his right not to be wounded,
or not to have his property damaged; but D's action does not answer to that
waiving, since she does not wound him (unless death is classed as a particularly
serious wound) or damage his property. On Bergelson's account, she is partly
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justified in killing him. (P. 105.) But how? It must be because he has "reduced"
his right(s); but what does that mean? Bergelson's answer seems to be that he has
reduced his "overall right not to be harmed," by waiving some of the "specific
rights" that constitute that overall right. (P. 91.) He has waived his specific right
not to be wounded, or not to have his property damaged, and that waiving reduces
the weight or value of the overall right not to be harmed. So whilst in killing him
D does violate his right not to be killed, and thus his overall right not to be harmed,
that violation constitutes a less serious wrong. But this seems a very strange
picture (and it is not helpful to treat all specific rights, as Bergelson's account
seems to commit her to treating them, as instantiations of a general right not to be
harmed). My right not to be killed is surely not reduced in weight or in value by
my waiving my right that my property not be damaged; and even if we look only at
harms of the same general type, such as bodily harms, it seems odd to suggest that
in waiving my right not to be wounded I also reduce the weight or value of my
right not to be killed.
Maybe a more detailed development and explication of Bergelson's account
would show either that these puzzles are not real or that they can be resolved; but
the book does not offer us enough explanation to show this, and must thus leave us
with the strong suspicion that we cannot explain these ways in which the victim's
conduct can affect the defendant's liability by talking of waiving or reducing
rights.
IV. VICTIM NEGLIGENCE AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Finally, can the victim's negligence, if it contributes to the causation of the
relevant harm (but not so significantly as to negate the defendant's causal
responsibility) make a difference to the defendant's criminal liability? It is striking
that whilst the issue of victim fault in tort law arises most typically when the fault
consists in negligence,4 Bergelson's discussion of criminal law focuses on the
difference that the alleged victim's intentional conduct can make to the defendant's
liability. Indeed, it sometimes looks as if only what V does intentionally can affect
D's liability:
The victim's conduct should mitigate the perpetrator's liability only
when the victim has waived his rights voluntarily, by consent or
assumption of risk, or lost them involuntarily, by attacking or threatening
some legally recognized rights of others. (P. 123.)5
4 As in Beul v. ASSE Int'l. Inc., 233 F.3d 441, 451 (7t' Cir. 2000), from which she quotes the
judicial claim by Judge Posner that "[v]ictim fault is not a defense, either partial or complete, to
criminal liability" (P. 2.)
s She is here discussing cases in which D uses force against V in response to, or to ward off,
a threat of harm that V creates.
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For she sets tight constraints on assumption of risk: V can be taken to have
assumed a risk of harm only if he "purposefully engage[s] in a risky activity" (p.
104), and "may not be deemed to have assumed the risk of unlawful conduct by
another." (P. 100, emphasis omitted.) We have also seen already that even
involuntary right-waiving requires that V chose "to change [his] moral status vis-A-
vis the perpetrator" (p. 76); this might cover cases in which V's conduct was
reckless rather than intentional, but does not capture merely negligent conduct.
Now Bergelson does not actually limit involuntary right-waiving to cases in which
V chooses to change his moral status, since she argues in the passage from which I
have just quoted that V's negligent risk-creation can reduce D's liability (to a
limited extent) when D uses force against V in response to that risk. (P. 123.) But
what should we make of the familiar tort law case in which Vs negligence plays a
casual role in the occurrence of the relevant harm-not the kind of case in which V
creates a risk to which D then responds, but the kind of case in which civil courts
would talk of "contributory negligence"?
Bergelson mentions this kind of case briefly, towards the end of the book: if V
is injured or killed by D's car, when D is drunk or speeding, D's liability should be
reduced if V's own negligence played a significant role in the causation of the
accident. (Pp. 156-57.) But how is this consistent with her account? V has
certainly not involuntarily waived or reduced his rights, since I involuntarily waive
or reduce my rights against another only if I act in a way that breaches some duty I
owe her-that is, only if she has a right that I not act thus. (P. 105.) Nor does it
seem that V has voluntarily waived or reduced his rights-he did not consent to
being crashed into by D; in many cases we could not plausibly say that he
"purposefully engage[d] in a risky activity" (p. 104) that led to the accident; and
since D's drunken or excessively fast driving is unlawful, V cannot, in any case, be
taken to have assumed the risk of it.6 Or should we say that what matters in such
cases of recklessness or negligence is comparative causation (pp. 144-54): that the
extent of D's responsibility for the harm that V suffers is conditioned by the causal
contribution that each made to the occurrence of the harm (p. 146)? But this brings
us to a point noted earlier: that while in tort law responsibility shared is usually
responsibility reduced for each of those who share it, the same is not true in
criminal law.
There would be an interesting and striking analogy between criminal law and
tort law if the victim's faulty (reckless or negligent) conduct should mitigate the
defendant's criminal liability, as it can mitigate his civil liability; but Bergelson's
6 I'm taking "unlawful conduct" at face value, to cover not just intentional attacks on
another, but offenses of recklessness or negligence. A narrower reading might be suggested by the
passage that Bergelson quotes in support of this limitation on what risks we can be deemed to have
assumed: people "must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury" (p. 100,
quoting ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 169 (1922)); so perhaps it
could be said that although I cannot assume the risk that another will attack me, I can assume the risk
that he will recklessly or negligently endanger me. But what would justify this narrower reading?
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brief comments on this issue are apparently at odds with the core of her argument
in this book, which emphasizes the victim's purposive conduct, and she does not
say enough to show whether that apparent inconsistency is real or not.
There are, as Bergelson shows, important questions about the ways in which
the (alleged) victim's conduct can affect the defendant's criminal liability, and
about whether we can find a unitary theory to explain them all. This book
proposes an ambitious unifying theory; but its argument is too often
underdeveloped, and (as I have tried to indicate) has too many internal problems,
to persuade us that it offers a promising route to understanding criminal liability in
"comparative" terms.
